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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiff Eileen Anne Neely, a young American employed at a 
Club Med resort in St. Lucia, was seriously injured when she was 
sucked into the propellers of a scuba diving vessel, the Long 
John.  Plaintiff was a member of the crew of the vessel, which 
was in St. Lucian coastal waters at the time of the accident.  
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She brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, and a jury there, responding to special 
interrogatories, found her employers negligent and the vessel 
unseaworthy, and awarded plaintiff a large verdict on her Jones 
Act, general maritime law, and maintenance and cure claims.  
Molding the verdict in response to post-trial motions, the court 
modified and substantially reduced the verdict by applying to the 
unseaworthiness claim the percentage of contributory negligence 
found by the jury with respect to the Jones Act claims.  Then, on 
cross-appeals, a panel of this court, invoking Lauritzen v. 
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921 (1953), vacated the entire 
judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the district court 
had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.  We 
granted rehearing in banc and vacated the panel opinion and 
judgment. 
 While the appeals present a large number of questions, we 
address only the subject matter jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
verdict molding issues.0  With respect to subject matter 
jurisdiction, we conclude that the multi-factored analysis 
                                                           
0We find without merit and without need for discussion the defendants’ contentions that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings: (1) that defendant Club Med 
Management employed plaintiff; (2) that defendant Holiday Village was the owner pro hac vice 
of the Long John; and (3) that the unseaworthy condition of the 
Long John was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.  The 
same is true of plaintiff’s contentions:  (1) that the district 
court erred in submitting the issue of her contributory 
negligence to the jury (on the grounds of insufficient evidence); 
(2) that the court erred in its charge with respect to the 
defendants’ denial of certain maintenance payments; and (3) that 
a new trial should have been granted because of the cumulative 
effect of discovery rule violations, prejudicial conduct by 
defense counsel, and “judicial misconduct.” 
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established by Lauritzen, Romero v. International Terminal 
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959), and Hellenic 
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970) 
(together, the “Lauritzen triad”), governs choice of law, not 
subject matter jurisdiction, in Jones Act and American general 
maritime law claims.  Then, applying the usual analyses for 
federal question and admiralty jurisdiction, we conclude that the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this suit. 
 Turning our attention to the multi-factored “substantial 
contacts” test of the Lauritzen triad, we adopt a two-stage 
interpretation of that test, subjecting the Lauritzen factors to 
a relatively simple sufficiency test followed by a more involved 
reasonableness inquiry.  We first find American maritime law 
potentially applicable in this case because the plaintiff is an 
American citizen.  Accordingly, we consider whether applying 
American law is reasonable under the circumstances.  Because the 
defendants did not inform the district court of the content of 
St. Lucian law, any interests St. Lucia might have in this case 
are undefined and, consequently, do little to render application 
of American law unreasonable.  Additionally, in considering the 
significance of the various Lauritzen factors, we pay heed to the 
non-traditional context of this suit.  By this we do not mean 
that the vessel involved here was unlike those in traditional, 
international shipping cases; rather, the activity here was non-
traditional, for the Long John did not take its crew from sea to 
sea in pursuit of international commerce but rather only from 
beach to reef in aid of scuba diving adventures. 
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 The accident occurred in St. Lucian waters, which as we 
explain is an important consideration in non-shipping contexts.  
And one of the defendants is a corporation organized under the 
laws of St. Lucia, a factor that also reflects some interest on 
the part of St. Lucia in applying its law.  But these factors do 
not mean that American law may not be reasonably applied under 
the circumstances.  Even when we add to these some evidence that 
the Long John, the vessel that injured plaintiff, was registered 
in St. Lucia, we cannot conclude that St. Lucia’s interests, 
whatever they may be, are so threatened or so strong that 
America’s interests must be ignored. 
 As our opinion explains, the United States has an overriding 
interest in assuring adequate compensation for its injured 
seamen.  In the non-shipping context of this case, the 
significance of plaintiff’s American allegiance is an especially 
important factor, and the relevance of the plaintiff’s having 
entered into her employment contract in the United States is also 
enhanced. Conversely, the law of the flag of the Long John is of 
diminished importance in the non-traditional context, and, at all 
events, the law of the flag would be entitled to virtually no 
significance here both because there was no evidence that the 
Long John actually flew the flag of St. Lucia (or any other 
nation) and because the district court was presented with no 
information as to the content of St. Lucian law. 
 Additionally, two of the defendants are American 
corporations, the Long John was built in America to American 
specifications, and the St. Lucian defendant, whose operations 
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are in large measure run by one of its affiliated American co-
defendants, derives the majority of its income from American 
tourists booked by another affiliated American co-defendant.  
Because the connections between this incident and the United 
States implicate significant American interests, and because 
consideration of all the circumstances confirms the 
reasonableness of applying United States law, we conclude that 
the contacts with the United States are “substantial,” and 
American laws, both the Jones Act and our general maritime law, 
apply to this suit. 
 We also conclude that the district court erred in molding 
the verdict to apply the percentage of comparative negligence 
found by the jury with respect to the Jones Act claim to the 
unseaworthiness claim.  We so hold because the defendants waived 
the issue, and because the court, which did not submit it to the 
jury, lacked authority to later make the omitted factual 
determinations sua sponte.  We will therefore affirm the order of 
the district court holding two of the defendants liable under 
American law, but will vacate the district court's order of 
January 26, 1993, and direct it, on remand, to enter judgment for 
the plaintiff against Club Med Management and Holiday Village in 
the full amount of damages found by the jury, as more fully 
explained below. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The defendants in this action are Club Med, Inc., Club Med 
Sales, Inc., and Club Med Management Services, Inc., all of which 
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have offices in New York, and Club Med, Inc.’s wholly owned 
subsidiary Holiday Village (St. Lucia) Ltd.  Of the 10,000 to 
15,000 people per year who vacation at the Club Med Holiday 
Village resort, approximately seventy to eighty percent come from 
the United States.  Seventy to eighty percent of Holiday 
Village’s annual income of approximately fifteen million dollars 
is generated by Holiday Village’s American sales bureau, Club Med 
Sales. 
 Plaintiff is an American citizen domiciled in Telford 
(Montgomery County), Pennsylvania.  After vacationing at a Club 
Med resort, she applied to Club Med for a position as a scuba 
diving instructor.  Plaintiff was interviewed in New York by Club 
Med Management, a New York corporation.  Following the interview, 
plaintiff received a letter of interest from the defendants, 
followed several months later by a phone call, initiated in New 
York by Club Med Management, offering her a position at Holiday 
Village, which she accepted.  In early May of 1991, the 
defendants arranged and paid the travel expenses for her to go to 
Holiday Village in St. Lucia. 
 Plaintiff was hired to work as an “au pair” for a six-week 
period.  She was not given a cash salary, but rather received 
room and board in exchange for her work.  Once at Holiday 
Village, she served as either Scuba Diving Instructor or 
Divemaster on approximately thirteen or fourteen voyages from May 
13 to May 23, 1991.  She typically had trips twice in the morning 
and once in the afternoon.  She was responsible for checking and 
preparing all equipment (which was stored aboard scuba diving 
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boats) for each voyage.  During the trips, she provided 
instruction and warnings to the Club Med guests who would be 
diving. 
 The scuba expeditions on which plaintiff worked were 
conducted by a small fleet operated by Holiday Village.  The 
fleet consisted of the Blue Lagoon, owned by Club Med, and the 
Long John, chartered by Holiday Village for use as a diving 
vessel from its title owner Joseph LeMaire (who lives in Miami, 
Florida but is not a United States citizen).  A declaration 
executed by LeMaire claimed that the Long John, which was built 
in the United States, was “registered” in St. Lucia, but the 
charter left blank the state of registry. 
 On May 23, 1991, plaintiff served Club Med guests on a scuba 
diving excursion on the Long John, which was captained by Philipe 
Le Cann.  When the boat arrived at the dive site in coastal 
waters off St. Lucia, the passengers and dive crew prepared to 
enter the water.  The boat was put in neutral, and, after donning 
her gear, plaintiff entered the water. 
 It was disputed whether Stephane Gaudry, the Divemaster, had 
given the signal to enter the water before plaintiff jumped in:  
the uncontroverted testimony was that Gaudry made no entry of 
plaintiff’s dive time on the dive log.  Whatever the precise 
sequence of events, after plaintiff had entered the water, the 
captain put the ship’s engines into reverse.  The churning 
propellers of the twin 350 horsepower diesel engines sucked 
plaintiff under the boat and into the ship’s propellers, which 
were not shielded by propeller guards, and she emerged on the 
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starboard side with extremely serious injuries to various parts 
of her body.  She was brought on board the ship, taken 
immediately to shore, and thereafter to a clinic and then a 
hospital. 
 After being treated, plaintiff was out of work for 
approximately five and one half months. During this time, she 
convalesced at her parents’ home in Telford, where they cared for 
her on a daily basis.  Despite two surgeries for nerve damage, 
her use of her right arm was permanently restricted; she also 
will require plastic surgery for her numerous conspicuous scars. 
 Plaintiff eventually brought suit in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pleading the federal 
question and admiralty statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1333 
(1988), as bases for subject matter jurisdiction.  She alleged 
that her injuries were caused by negligence in violation of the 
Jones Act, and by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel in 
violation of the general maritime law.  The defendants interposed 
a host of defenses, including contributory negligence and, 
relying on Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921 
(1953), and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 
S. Ct. 1731 (1970), the claim that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to apply American law.  Although they 
argued that St. Lucia had a greater interest in having its law 
applied, the defendants did not present the court with any 
information concerning the law of St. Lucia. 
 The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, 
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and allowed the suit to go to trial.  During trial, the court 
ruled, without objection from the defendants, that contributory 
negligence was not a defense to the unseaworthiness claim.  At 
the close of trial, the court instructed the jury and provided it 
with a special verdict form, the first draft of which had been 
prepared by defense counsel.  The form required the jury to 
answer a number of specific questions, grouped and captioned as 
we now describe. 
 The first set of questions were presented under the heading 
“Jones Act Claim.”  In these, the jury was asked whether 
plaintiff was employed by one or more of the defendants; if so, 
which defendant or defendants were her employer; whether her 
employer or employers were negligent; whether any such negligence 
was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injuries; 
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent; whether any such 
contributory negligence was a substantial factor in bringing 
about her injuries; and how the causal negligence should be 
allocated (totalling 100%) among the employer or employers and, 
if appropriate, the plaintiff. 
 The second set of questions were grouped under the caption 
“General Maritime Claim.” In this section of the form the jury 
was required to answer whether any of the defendants owned or 
sufficiently controlled the Long John to qualify as owner or 
owner pro hac vice; if so, which defendant(s) controlled the 
vessel; whether the plaintiff had shown that the vessel was 
unseaworthy; and if so, whether the unseaworthiness was a 
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substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s injuries.  This 
section asked no questions about contributory responsibility. 
 The third section of the special verdict sheet was labeled 
“Damages.”  The jury was there directed to “[s]tate the amount of 
damages, if any, sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of the 
accident, without regard to and without reduction by the 
percentage of causal negligence, if any, that you have attributed 
to the plaintiff.” 
 The fourth and final portion of the verdict sheet was 
captioned “Maintenance.”  There, the jury was asked whether it 
found the plaintiff entitled to maintenance, and whether any of 
the defendants (and, if so, which) acted unreasonably in denying 
maintenance to her. 
 On the Jones Act questions, the jury found that plaintiff 
was employed by Club Med Management and by Holiday Village, that 
those defendants had been negligent, and that their negligence 
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.  
The jury also found, however, that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent.  It allocated the total causal 
negligence thirty percent to Club Med Management, ten percent to 
Holiday Village, and sixty percent to the plaintiff.  In answer 
to the General Maritime Law questions, the jury found that 
Holiday Village exercised sufficient control over the Long John 
to be its owner pro hac vice.  It also found the Long John to 
have been unseaworthy, and that the unseaworthiness was a 
substantial factor causing plaintiff’s injuries. 
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 On the remaining questions, the jury found the plaintiff’s 
total damages sustained from the accident, without regard to any 
causal negligence on her own part, to be $545,000.  It also found 
that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance, but that none of 
the defendants had acted unreasonably in withholding payment.  
Thereupon, the district court molded the verdict to reflect 
plaintiff’s comparative negligence:  On the Jones Act claim, the 
court entered judgment against Club Med Management and Holiday 
Village in the amount of forty percent of $545,000, that is, 
$218,000.  On the maintenance claim, the court entered judgment 
against the same defendants for $11,700, but denied attorney’s 
fees to plaintiff because the jury had found that the denial of 
maintenance was not unreasonable.  On the unseaworthiness claim, 
the court entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor against Holiday 
Village in the full amount of $545,000. 
 A week later the defendants moved the district court to mold 
the verdict on the unseaworthiness claim.  Relying upon case law 
holding that comparative fault is a partial defense to general 
maritime law unseaworthiness claims, the defendants urged the 
district court to reduce the unseaworthiness verdict by sixty 
percent, the percentage of the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence on the Jones Act claim.  Over plaintiff’s objection, 
the district court entered an order so modifying the judgment. 
 Plaintiff filed a timely appeal, and defendants cross-
appealed.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), we have appellate 




II.  THE LAURITZEN TRIAD AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
 Beginning with their initial answer in the district court, 
the defendants have argued that, pursuant to the multi-factored 
analysis developed in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 
S. Ct. 921 (1953), and Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 
306, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970), the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Jones Act and general 
maritime law unseaworthiness claims.  Because subject matter 
jurisdiction restrictions impose a limit on the power of the 
federal courts to entertain an action, we must first consider 
whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s suit.  If the district court lacked such 
jurisdiction, it would be our duty to vacate the judgments in 
plaintiff’s favor and direct the district court to dismiss her 
action. 
 We hold that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over this suit.  This ruling primarily reflects a 
disagreement with defendants’ premise that the Lauritzen triad 
(composed of Lauritzen, Rhoditis, and Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959)) 
provides the framework for determining whether a district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction in Jones Act or general maritime 
law cases. 
A.  The Non-Jurisdictional Nature of the 
Lauritzen Choice-of-Law Analysis 
 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921 (1953), 
the Supreme Court enunciated a number of factors to be considered 
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by courts evaluating whether a plaintiff may sue under the Jones 
Act.  These factors include: 
 (1) the place of the wrongful act, 
 (2) the law of the flag, 
 (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured plaintiff, 
 (4) the allegiance of the defendant, 
 (5) the place of contract, 
 (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and 
 (7) the law of the forum. 
See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 73 S. Ct. at 928-33.  The 
Court reiterated the relevance of these factors in Romero, see 
358 U.S. at 383, 79 S. Ct. at 486, and in Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. 
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (1970), it added the 
defendant’s base of operations to this list, id. at 309, 90 
S. Ct. at 1734. 
 Defendants believe that this inquiry determines whether the 
district court has subject matter jurisdiction.  This view was 
not challenged in the district court, which considered the 
factors and found subject matter jurisdiction, or before the 
panel, which reconsidered them but found no jurisdiction.  
Moreover, a number of cases in various jurisdictions so hold.  
However, after granting rehearing in banc, we sua sponte directed 
the parties to prepare supplemental briefing on the question 
whether the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis factors (henceforth 
referred to as the “Lauritzen factors” for simplicity) in fact go 
to subject matter jurisdiction.  With the benefit of counsel’s 
briefing and argument, and after studying the Supreme Court’s 
opinions and numerous cases interpreting them, we conclude that 
the Lauritzen factors are not a test for subject matter 
jurisdiction, but rather constitute a non-exhaustive list of 
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contacts for choice of law analysis in suits for maritime 
injuries with foreign connections. 
 In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court was called on to answer a 
question of the extraterritorial applicability of the Jones Act.  
While in New York, Larsen, a Danish seaman, had signed onto a 
ship of Danish flag and registry owned by Lauritzen, another 
Danish citizen.  The ship’s articles that Larsen signed were 
written in Danish and specified that Danish law would govern the 
crewmembers’ rights.  After being injured in the course of his 
employment while in Havana harbor, Larsen brought suit against 
Lauritzen in the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, seeking to recover damages under the Jones Act.  Over 
Lauritzen’s objection that Danish law rather than American law 
governed, the district court allowed the case to go to the jury 
under the Jones Act, which rendered a verdict in Larsen’s favor.  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 The Court formulated the “key issue” as “whether statutes of 
the United States should be applied to this claim of maritime 
tort.”  Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 573, 73 S. Ct. at 923.  As did the 
defendants herein, Lauritzen had framed his objection in terms of 
subject matter jurisdiction, but the Court quickly disposed of 
this argument: 
The question of jurisdiction is shortly answered.  . . .  As 
frequently happens, a contention that there is some barrier 
to granting plaintiff’s claim is cast in terms of an 
exception to jurisdiction of subject matter.  A cause of 
action under our law was asserted here, and the court had 
power to determine whether it was or was not well founded in 
law and in fact. 
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Id. at 574, 73 S. Ct. at 924.  Thus, the Court’s later analysis 
introducing the now-famous Lauritzen factors was directed to 
choice of law, see id. at 583, 73 S. Ct. at 928, not subject 
matter jurisdiction, which the Court had already determined was 
present. 
 Similarly, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating 
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959), the Court faced suit 
brought under American law by a foreign sailor.  Romero, a 
Spanish seaman, had signed onto the crew of a vessel of Spanish 
registry that sailed under the Spanish flag and was owned by a 
Spanish corporation.  After departing from a Spanish port, the 
ship made numerous stops, including one in Hoboken, where Romero 
was injured when struck by a cable on the ship’s deck.  He filed 
suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
contending inter alia that the shipowner (“Compania”) was liable 
to him under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law of 
the United States for unseaworthiness of the ship, maintenance 
and cure, and maritime tort.  The alleged bases for jurisdiction 
were the Jones Act, federal question jurisdiction, and diversity 
jurisdiction. 
 The district court dismissed the complaint after a pre-trial 
hearing.  It concluded that the Jones Act provided no right of 
action to an alien seaman under the circumstances involved, and 
thus that the court lacked jurisdiction over the Jones Act claim 
against Compania.  The court dismissed the general maritime claim 
against the corporation because the company was not of diverse 
citizenship from Romero and because of its conclusion that the 
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federal question statute did not embrace general maritime law 
claims. 
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.  In Part I 
of its opinion, entitled “Jurisdiction,” id. at 359, 79 S. Ct. at 
473, the Court concluded that the district court possessed 
subject matter jurisdiction of the claims. With respect to the 
Jones Act claims, it noted: 
[T]he question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused 
with the question whether the complaint states a cause of 
action.  Petitioner asserts a substantial claim that the 
Jones Act affords him a right of recovery for the negligence 
of his employer.  Such assertion alone is sufficient to 
empower the District Court to assume jurisdiction over the 
case and determine whether, in fact, the Act does provide 
the claimed rights. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Court 
then affirmed Lauritzen’s holding that the usual federal question 
approach to subject matter jurisdiction governs Jones Act suits. 
See id.0 
 Importantly, the Romero Court turned to the Lauritzen 
factors (in Part II of its opinion, entitled “The Claims Against 
Compania Transatlantica--The Choice-of-Law Problem,” id. at 381, 
79 S. Ct. at 485) only after concluding that the district court 
had erred in dismissing Romero’s suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the Court’s decision in Romero confirms that 
                                                           
0The issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the unseaworthiness and general maritime law tort 
claims was more complicated due to the procedural posture of the case, which preceded the 1966 
procedural unification of the civil and admiralty “sides” of federal district court.  We note here 
only that the Supreme Court held that where plaintiffs properly alleged a Jones Act claim, the 
district court might exercise “pendent jurisdiction” to determine whether they also properly stated 
a general maritime law cause of action, even if the complaint was not filed as a libel in admiralty.  
For further discussion, see GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 
§ 6-62 (2d ed. 1975). 
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the Lauritzen factors are not a test for subject matter 
jurisdiction but rather govern choice of law.  The innovation in 
Romero was its pronouncement that the Lauritzen analysis should 
govern not only Jones Act claims but also claims under the 
general maritime law for personal injury damages.  Id. at 382, 79 
S. Ct. at 485. 
 Our understanding of these precedents is confirmed by a 
leading admiralty treatise.  See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, 
JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-63 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter LAW OF 
ADMIRALTY].  Discussing “Choice of Law in Actions Brought in the 
United States by Seamen Injured on Foreign-Flag Ships,” the 
authors explain that when “a seaman brings an action to recover 
for personal injuries, the court must initially decide whether it 
has jurisdiction and, if it has, whether United States law or the 
law of a foreign nation is applicable.”  Id. at 471.  They go on 
to discuss Lauritzen and Romero as follows: 
The majority of the Court concluded that neither the situs 
of the injury nor Romero’s treatment in this country made a 
case, under the Lauritzen criteria, for application of 
American law in Romero’s action against his employer, the 
Spanish Line.  Justice Frankfurter’s opinion emphasized that 
the issue was one of choice of law and not of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  That is, the District Court, having decided 
that Romero’s action against his employer was not governed 
by American law, could have retained jurisdiction of the 
action and decided it under Spanish law. 
Id. at 473 (emphasis supplied).0 
 The Supreme Court’s third and latest pronouncement on the 
role of the Lauritzen factors came in 1970.  While the Court’s 
                                                           
0The district court had chosen as a matter of discretion not to exercise admiralty jurisdiction over 
any claims that Romero might have under Spanish law.  See id. at 358, 79 S. Ct. 
at 472. See also infra note 30. 
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opinion in Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 
S. Ct. 1731 (1970), is partially opaque, it does not signal a 
change in the purpose and use of the Lauritzen analysis.  
Rhoditis concerned a suit under the Jones Act by a Greek seaman 
for injuries he suffered aboard a ship in the Port of New 
Orleans.  Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial and 
appellate courts that the Jones Act applied, the Court did not 
need to differentiate between subject matter jurisdiction and the 
plaintiff’s entitlement to proceed under the Jones Act--both were 
present.  But the opinion’s description of the Lauritzen analysis 
makes clear that the Court viewed the factors as bearing on 
applicability of the Act, rather than subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 The Court explicitly endorsed the description of the 
Lauritzen analysis offered by Judge Medina, who in Bartholomew v. 
Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), had 
written: 
[T]he decisional process of arriving at a conclusion on the 
subject of the application of the Jones Act involves the 
ascertainment of the facts or groups of facts which 
constitute contacts between the transaction involved in the 
case and the United States, and then deciding whether or not 
they are substantial. 
Id. at 441 (quoted in Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309 n.4, 90 S. Ct. at 
1734 n.4) (emphasis supplied here).  Furthermore, in adding the 
shipowner’s base of operations to the analysis, the Court 
characterized it as “another factor of importance in determining 
whether the Jones Act is applicable.”  Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309, 
90 S. Ct. at 1734 (emphases supplied). 
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 It is true that the Court’s opinion in Rhoditis twice used 
the word “jurisdiction.”0 However, the presence of two 
occurrences of the word “jurisdiction” is too ambiguous to 
mandate a change in the jurisprudence,0 particularly since the 
Court likely meant to refer to “legislative jurisdiction,” see 
id. at 314 & n.2, 90 S. Ct. at 1736-37 & n.2 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (which is also known as prescriptive jurisdiction, 
                                                           
0
“Of these seven factors, it is urged that four are in favor of the shipowner and against 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 308, 90 S. Ct. at 1733.  See also id. at 309, 90 
S. Ct. at 1734 (referring to “the national interest served by the 
assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction”). 
0One district court has suggested that perhaps the Supreme Court’s reference to “Jones Act 
jurisdiction” was not “intended to overrule Lauritzen and Romero,” but rather was 
“merely an unguarded and passing dictum.”  Karvelis v. 
Constellation Lines SA, 608 F. Supp. 966, 968 n.2, aff’d, 806 
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986).  In this regard, we take special note of 
Rodriguez v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 703 F.2d 1069 
(9th Cir. 1983), which is one of very few reported cases to 
attempt a careful analysis of the nature of the Lauritzen 
inquiry.  In Rodriguez, the court of appeals rejected a Colombian 
seaman’s attempt to sue his employer (a Colombian corporation 
based in Colombia) under the Jones Act.  But, as then-Judge 
Kennedy recognized in a separate concurrence, the majority went 
astray when it read Rhoditis as authorizing a district court to 
dismiss a Jones Act case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
when the Lauritzen factors do not support application of American 
law.  See id. at 1072.  Judge Kennedy agreed that the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim under the Jones Act but wrote separately 
“to call attention to a conceptual problem in these cases, 
namely, whether to characterize an unsuccessful Jones Act claim 
as lacking in subject matter jurisdiction or as failing to state 
a cause of action.”  Id. at 1075.  Judge Kennedy believed that 
the Supreme Court’s reference in Rhoditis to “jurisdiction” was 
“only a passing and unguarded remark.”  Id. at 1076.  After 
reviewing Lauritzen, Romero, and several Court of Appeals cases, 
Judge Kennedy concluded that Lauritzen analysis does not go to 
subject matter jurisdiction, for “the issue is whether or not 
there is a failure to state a claim, and we resort to choice of 
law principles to answer the question.”  Id. See also Dracos v. 
Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (properly analyzing Lauritzen factors 
as choice of law contacts, not subject matter jurisdiction 
factors), on reh’g, 762 F.2d 348 (1985) (en banc). 
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see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, at 230 (1987)).  
Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction was not presented in the 
Questions for Review in the petition for certiorari.  See 
Petition for Writ of Cert. at 2-3, Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. 
Rhoditis, 412 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1969) (No. 661), cert. granted, 
396 U.S. 100, 90 S. Ct. 554 (1970).  Rather, the first Question, 
which is characteristic, was: 
Were the lower courts correct in applying the Jones Act to 
an action by a Greek seaman, himself a resident of Greece, 
against a Greek corporate owner for injury occurring aboard 
a Greek flag vessel, solely on the ground that the majority 
stock holder of the corporate ship owner, although himself a 
Greek citizen, resided in the United States as a 
representative of Greece to the United Nations. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 Moreover, treating the Lauritzen analysis as going to 
subject matter jurisdiction would be out of keeping with the 
approach of most jurisdictional inquiries, which tend to be 
straightforward threshold questions.  “The dangers of a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach to jurisdiction would be obvious.  
An undefined test requires courts and litigants to devote 
substantial resources to determine whether a federal court may 
hear a specific case.”  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1057 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  The federal judiciary “pursues 
clarity and efficiency in other areas of federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and it should demand no less in admiralty and 
maritime law.”  Id. at 1059. 
 Thus, we conclude that the multi-factored analysis of 
Lauritzen, Romero, and Rhoditis is not to be used to determine 
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whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
suits brought under the Jones Act or the general maritime law.  
Insofar as Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 F.2d 231 (3d 
Cir. 1991), holds that the Lauritzen factors govern subject 
matter jurisdiction over Jones Act or general maritime law 
claims, it is overruled.  In so ruling, we agree with the cases 
from other circuits that have used the Lauritzen analysis to 
determine choice of law, not subject matter jurisdiction.  See, 
e.g., Schexnider v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 817 F.2d 1159 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (affirming district court’s determination that 
Lauritzen dictated applicability of Australian law but requiring 
that district court retain jurisdiction and try the case); cf. 
also supra note 21 (citing concurring and dissenting opinions 
that correctly apprehend the issue).  Concomitantly, we 
necessarily disagree with those cases from other circuits holding 
(without addressing the clear force of Romero) that the Lauritzen 
analysis may be used to dismiss a Jones Act claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Diana 
Investments Corp., 946 F.2d  455, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam) (affirming dismissal of suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction flowing from non-applicability of American law under 
Lauritzen analysis); Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 
348, 349-50 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same);0 Rodriguez v. Flota 
                                                           
0While Dracos did cite Romero, the en banc majority read it as 
merely holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to consider 
their own jurisdiction.  See Dracos, 762 F.2d at 350 (citing 
Romero, 358 U.S. at 359, 79 S. Ct. at 473).  As our foregoing 
discussion shows, this is not what Romero holds. 
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Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 703 F.2d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 
1983) (same).   
B.  Federal Question and Admiralty Jurisdiction 
 Although we have demonstrated that the Lauritzen inquiry is 
non-jurisdictional in nature, there remains the question whether 
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s claims, which the defendants have contested 
throughout this litigation.  We conclude that it did, under both 
the federal question and the admiralty jurisdiction statutes. 
1. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
 In its first Jones Act case, the Supreme Court held that the 
Jones Act, as a federal statute providing remedies for injured 
seamen, is subject to the usual rule for “arising-under” 
jurisdiction.  See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 383-
84, 44 S. Ct. 391, 392 (1924) (“This case arose under a law of 
the United States [i.e., the Jones Act] and involved the 
requisite amount, if any was requisite; so there can be no doubt 
that the case was within the general jurisdiction conferred on 
the district courts by [the federal question statute] . . . .”); 
see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 
2917 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (discussing 
Lauritzen and distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from 
applicability of American law). 
 Section 1331 provides that the federal “district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).  “The question of whether the district 
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court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to [the Jones Act] 
is not whether [plaintiff] had a valid cause of action against 
the [defendants] under federal . . . law.  Rather, the subject 
matter jurisdiction analysis is one of whether the determination 
of the existence vel non of that cause of action is a question 
‘arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.’”  
Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters Health & Welfare Pension 
Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1032 (3d Cir. 1988).  Plaintiff clearly 
meets that standard, for whether she could assert claims under 
the Jones Act and general maritime law is a question of federal 
law.  The district court clearly had jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s Jones Act claims.0 
2. Admiralty Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 
 Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the defendants allege 
violations of the general maritime law duty to provide a 
seaworthy vessel.  Again, although the Lauritzen factors are to 
be used in determining the applicability of substantive American 
maritime law, they do not go to subject matter jurisdiction.  
Rather, for non-statutory causes of action, we apply the 
customary admiralty jurisdiction analysis of Executive Jet 
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 
(1972), Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 
2654 (1982), and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892 
                                                           
0Defendants do not contend, nor could they, that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff’s Jones Act claim “clearly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or [that her] claim is wholly insubstantial 




(1990), as recently reaffirmed in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995). 
 “[A] party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim must satisfy 
conditions both of location and of connection with maritime 
activity.”  Id. at 1048.  For tort claims, the locality test 
requires that “the tort occurred on navigable water or . . . 
injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable 
water.” Id.  Here, the locality test is “readily satisfied,” id. 
at 1049, for plaintiff’s injuries occurred in navigable waters 
and were caused there by a vessel, see id. at 1048. 
 The maritime connection inquiry is two-fold.  First, we 
“assess the general features of the type of incident involved to 
determine whether the incident has a potentially disrupting 
impact on maritime commerce.”  Id. (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Second, we “determine whether the 
general character of the activity giving rise to the incident 
shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime 
activity.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 With respect to the potential disruption prong, we describe 
the incident “at an intermediate level of possible generality.”  
Id. at 1051.  Following the Supreme Court’s lead, the “general 
features of the incident at issue here may be described as damage 
by a vessel in navigable water to [a seaman].”  Id.0  “So 
                                                           
0On appeal, the defendants did not challenge plaintiff’s seaman status, which flowed from her 
being a crewmember of the vessels in the Club Med fleet, and which we accordingly take as 
given for purposes of this case.  Cf. Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum 
Corp., 613 F.2d 1240, 1245 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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characterized, . . . this is the kind of incident that has a 
potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.”  Id.  Injury 
to a seaman in navigable waters “could lead to restrictions on 
the navigational use of the waterway,” id., during necessary 
investigations into the accident, which could be especially 
lengthy in a case where the seaman’s injuries proved fatal.  
Additionally, a vessel’s need to replace an incapacitated seaman 
could lead to delays in commercial shipping.  Although this case 
involves a pleasure boat rather than a vessel engaged in 
commercial shipping, that fact does not affect the jurisdictional 
result.  In Sisson v. Ruby, the features of the incident were 
described as “a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable 
waters,” 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S. Ct. at 2896, even though the 
“vessel” was a pleasure boat. 
 The second prong of the maritime connection test is also 
easily met here.  “In the second Sisson enquiry, we look to 
whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the 
incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime 
activity.”  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1051.  
“Navigation of boats in navigable waters clearly falls within the 
substantial relationship . . . .”  Id.  Thus, the travels of the 
Long John qualify despite the short distances involved in its 
voyages.  Cf. Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 600 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (upholding admiralty jurisdiction over claim arising 
from failure of crew of vessel that transported plaintiff to 
detect symptoms of and administer proper care for decompression 
sickness suffered during scuba diving investigation in navigable 
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waters); see also 1 STEVEN F. FREIDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 171, at 
11-22 to -23 nn.54-56 (7th ed. rev. 1995) (citing cases finding 
admiralty jurisdiction over claims that navigation errors or 
negligent operation of vessel injured others) [hereinafter 
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY].  Since the locality and maritime connection 
tests were clearly met, the district court had admiralty 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.0 
                                                           
0In so holding we note that the Supreme Court has not been receptive to defendants’ arguments 
that “virtually every activity involving a vessel on navigable waters would be a traditional 
maritime activity sufficient to invoke maritime navigation.”  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 115 
S. Ct. at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nor has the 
Court departed far from the situs test for admiralty 
jurisdiction, see id. at 1052-53, but rather has “simply . . . 
reject[ed] a location rule so rigid as to extend admiralty to a 
case involving an airplane, not a vessel, engaged in an activity 
far removed from anything traditionally maritime.”  Id. at 1053. 
Although not “every tort involving a vessel on navigable waters 
falls within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction no matter what, 
. . . ordinarily that will be so.”  Id.  This case lacks any 
exceptional circumstances that could take it out of the ordinary 
run.  Accordingly, plaintiff’s general maritime law claims come 
within the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction. 
 Additionally, although diversity or alienage were not pled 
as bases for the district court’s jurisdiction over Neely’s 
claims against Club Med Management and Holiday Village, the 
amount in controversy has at all times easily exceeded $50,000, 
and so the facts show that the district court had diversity 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988), over the claims of 
Neely (a Pennsylvania citizen) against Club Med Management (a New 
York corporation), and Club Med Sales (a Delaware corporation), 
and alienage jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1988), over 
the claims against Club Med, Inc. (a Cayman Islands corporation) 
and Holiday Village (a St. Lucian corporation).   By statute, we 
are authorized to permit amendment to the complaint to correct 
defective allegations.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988) (“Defective 
allegations of subject matter jurisdiction may be amended, upon 
terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”).  Thus, if we had 
doubts whether the plaintiff’s general maritime law claims fell 
within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction, we could 
permit amendment (as plaintiff has requested) to avoid the great 
waste of judicial resources that would otherwise attend the 
plaintiff’s having alleged only two bases for jurisdiction 
(federal question and admiralty), rather than three (those plus 
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III.  APPLICABILITY OF AMERICAN LAW UNDER THE LAURITZEN TRIAD 
A.  Introduction 
 The questions whether American law actually applies under 
the Lauritzen triad, and if so whether the facts entitle the 
plaintiff to recover, arise only when, as here, a district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over a Jones Act or American 
general maritime law claim. Moreover, Lauritzen analysis is a 
choice of law methodology, and, like a plaintiff’s need to prove 
one or more of the specific statutory elements of his or her 
claims, choice of law issues may be waived.0  Thus, if defendants 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
diversity). Cf. Local No. 1 (ACA) Broadcast Employees of Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 614 F.2d 
846 (3d Cir. 1980) (allowing plaintiff to amend complaint to cure 
defective jurisdictional allegations).  We therefore need not 
rely on the doctrine that where plaintiffs invoke federal 
question jurisdiction to bring a Jones Act suit, federal district 
courts have “pendent” jurisdiction over parallel unseaworthiness 
claims.  See, e.g., Romero, 358 U.S. at 380-81, 79 S. Ct. at 484-
85; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 548 n.14, 94 S. Ct. 1372, 
1385 n.14 (1974) (recognizing existence of this doctrine); 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993) (generally granting district courts 
“supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so 
related to claim in the action within [the district courts’] 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution”). 
0See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 
F.2d 1001, 1005 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980); Bagdon v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Corrugated Paper Prods., Inc. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d 
908, 910 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989); R.L. Clark Drilling Contractors, 
Inc. v. Schramm, Inc., 835 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1987); 
Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th 
Cir. 1986); Bilancia v. General Motors Corp., 538 F.2d 621, 622-
23 (4th Cir. 1976).  See also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 284 (1990) (“It is the parties’ 
responsibility to call a choice of law issue to the court’s 
attention.  If plaintiff bases his claim on inapplicable law 
(i.e., a law that does not give plaintiff a right to relief), the 
defendant must notify the court in a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for directed verdict.  Failure to make a timely motion 
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do not argue that American law is inapplicable as a matter of 
choice of law, the court will not analyze the Lauritzen factors.  
The plaintiff would need only to prove the particular elements of 
the cause of action, such as seaman status, employer status, 
negligence, causation, and damages (for a Jones Act case). 
 When a defendant does raise the Lauritzen issue, a plaintiff 
suing for personal injury damages under American maritime law 
must, as with any other cause of action, both establish the 
applicability of the law under which the case was brought and 
prove the elements of the other nations.0ary course, fail on the 
merits.0 
B.  Purposes of and Problems with the Lauritzen Analysis 
 Determining whether or not American maritime law (statutory 
or general) applies with respect to a given incident entails a 
choice of law analysis, mandated by the Supreme Court as a matter 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
waives any claim--however meritorious--that plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover as a matter of law.”); id. at 291. 
0The two identified purposes are not unrelated, for if American law were held to apply in 
situations where the United States has no appreciable interest, it would invi. 1962) (“Generally a 
party must establish a fact which is essential to his claim or defense . . . .”).  If American law is 
not applicable, or if the plaintiff fails to prove one of the specific elements of the cause of action, 
the suit would, in the o 
0If the plaintiff has also pled in the alternative the applicability of foreign law (which Neely has 
not done here), the court may of course adjudicate any such claims over which there is a basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Where the locality and maritime connection tests are met, see 
supra at 25-28 (discussing admiralty jurisdiction tests), 28 
U.S.C. § 1333 will provide such a basis.  We note also that some 
courts have not required a plaintiff affirmatively to plead the 
applicability of foreign law at the outset, but instead have 
applied foreign law after concluding that American law does not 
apply.  See, e.g., Schexnider v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 817 F.2d 
1159, 1160-61, 1164 (5th Cir. 1987).  Where American law does not 
apply and the plaintiff and defendant are both foreign, however, 
admiralty courts sometimes decline to exercise jurisdiction. See 
1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 128, at 8-40 to -41 & n.9. 
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of statutory construction.  The Court adverted to choice of law 
principles because of the facial universality of the Jones Act, 
whose terms offer a remedy to “any seaman.”  46 U.S.C. § 688(a) 
(1988).  In Lauritzen--which involved a lawsuit by a Danish 
sailor (for injuries suffered in the coastal waters off Cuba) 
against his employer, a Danish shipowner with whom he had 
contracted (in Danish)--the Court was concerned with restricting 
the “literal catholicity,” Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 576, 73 S. Ct. 
at 925, of the Jones Act’s language to ensure that it would not 
apply to situations where “the seaman, the employment [and] the 
injury [lack] the slightest connection with the United States.”  
Id. at 577, 73 S. Ct. at 925.  Thus, the first aim of Lauritzen 
analysis is to assure that American maritime law is not applied 
to incidents that lack any significant American connection. 
 The second, related purpose of the analysis is to resolve 
and avoid conflicts with the maritime laws of other nations.0  
See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S. Ct. at 928.  To this end 
the Court invoked a presumption that in the absence of specific 
direction to the contrary, statutes of Congress would not be 
interpreted to violate international law.  See 345 U.S. at 577, 
581, 73 S. Ct. at 926, 927-28.  Applying this presumption to the 
Jones Act, the Court in Lauritzen adopted a form of interest 
analysis to cabin the sweep of the Jones Act.  See id. at 582, 73 
                                                           
0The two identified purposes are not unrelated, for if American law were held to apply in 
situations where the United States has no appreciable interest, it would invite other nations to 
construe their laws in a similar fashion, cf. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S. 
Ct. at 928 (discussing reciprocity concerns), inevitably 
escalating the number of true conflicts in international maritime 
contexts to an unacceptably high level. 
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S. Ct. at 928 (“The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at 
from weighing of the significance of one or more connecting 
factors between the shipping transaction regulated and the 
national interest served by the assertion of authority.”) 
(emphasis supplied); id. at 577, 73 S. Ct. at 925 (extolling 
expertise of “courts long accustomed to dealing with admiralty 
problems in reconciling our own with foreign interests”).  Courts 
ruling on the reach of American law were thus directed to 
consider seven factors that were, in part for pragmatic reasons, 
accorded various degrees of importance. 
 In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 
at 354, 79 S. Ct. at 468, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
Lauritzen factors were gleaned not from the terms of the Jones 
Act but rather from more general maritime law choice of law 
principles, and that they were intended to guide courts generally 
in applying maritime law regarding personal injury claims to 
incidents with foreign connections.  See 358 U.S. at 382, 79 
S. Ct. at 485.0  Finally, in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, the 
Supreme Court elaborated upon the Lauritzen analysis. In 
particular, the Court added an eighth factor for consideration, 
see 398 U.S. at 309, 90 S. Ct. at 1734, and attached a label to 
the types of contacts with the United States necessary to sustain 
applicability of American law in light of the aims of the 
                                                           
0Courts are of course, subject to explicit congressional directives as to choice of law, see 
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 579 n.7, 73 S. Ct. at 926 n.7, where they 
are constitutional, see Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 




Lauritzen analysis:  “substantial” contacts.  Id. at 309 n.4, 90 
S. Ct. at 1734 n.4. 
 In adopting this terminology, the Court placed its focus 
primarily, though not myopically, on whatever American contacts 
the transaction may have.  See id. (“The decisional process . . . 
involves the ascertainment of the factors or groups of facts 
which constitute contacts between the transaction involved in the 
case and the United States, and then deciding whether or not they 
are substantial.”) (quoting Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, 
Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1959)); id. at 310, 73 S. Ct. at 
1734 (“The [foreign contacts present] are in the totality of the 
circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales compared 
with the substantial and continuing contacts that this alien 
owner has with this country.”). 
 Despite these developments, Lauritzen interest analysis 
remained a somewhat amorphous process.  The Supreme Court 
stressed in Rhoditis that Lauritzen’s choice of law interest 
analysis is not mechanical, that the significance of each factor 
is variable, and that the enumerated factors are not exhaustive 
of potentially relevant considerations.  See 398 U.S. at 308, 90 
S. Ct. at 1734.  The analysis is consequently imbued with a 
flexibility that permits courts to take account of the context of 
any incident that American law is alleged to govern, but this 
malleability has not always proven the surest guide.  Indeed, one 
troubled trial court remarked that the case law applying the 
Lauritzen triad had “made the relative significances of the 
‘factors’ almost infinitely variable,” and it feared “that each 
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‘factor’s’ significance is sufficiently obscure or variable to 
justify any judicial conclusion.”  Munusamy v. McClelland 
Engineers, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D. Tex.), mandamus 
denied (with request for certification), 742 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 
1984), order vacated, 784 F.2d 1313 (1986).  Academic commentary 
has been similarly critical. See, e.g., Michael Boydston, Cruz v. 
Chesapeake Shipping and the Choice-of-Law Problem in Admiralty 
Actions, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 419, 434 (1992); Symeon Symeonides, 
Maritime Conflicts of Law from the Perspective of Modern Choice 
of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAW. 223, 242-43 (1982) [hereinafter 
Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts]. 
C.  The Two Steps of the Laurit_!oice of Law Inquiry 
 The solution to the lack of guidance lies in approaching the 
Lauritzen analysis in a way that is faithful to its nature as a 
specialized form of interest analysis designed to ensure that 
American maritime law of personal injuries applies only where 
significant American interests are implicated and only in 
conformity with international law.  Specifically, we interpret 
the notion of “substantial contacts” to embody these twin 
concerns in a two-step inquiry derived from international law.  
We conclude below that, in a Jones Act or general maritime law 
case, a court deciding whether American contacts are 
“substantial” (so that American law applies) must at the 
threshold ask whether one of the following factors is involved in 
the incident, in which case there is a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction (which, we explain infra subsection 1, means that 
significant American interests are implicated):  injury to an 
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American seaman or a seaman with American dependents, injury in 
American territory, American defendants, an American flagged 
ship, or a contractual choice-of-law clause specifying American 
law.  If so, the second step in the substantial contacts inquiry 
is for the court to ascertain whether application of American law 
is reasonable under the circumstances, in which case (as 
subsection 2 describes) international law is satisfied.0 
 In this case, as we explain below, the plaintiff succeeds on 
both steps of the inquiry.  Her American citizenship satisfies 
the threshold requirement of a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction, and consideration of the Lauritzen factors reveals 
that the American interests at stake here are such that American 
law may be reasonably applied.  Hence, the American contacts are 
“substantial” and the plaintiff was entitled to sue under 
American law. 
                                                           
0The dissent rejects our analysis, suggesting that “under the Lauritzen test, the 
plaintiff must prove that a simple majority or preponderance of 
the factors weighs in favor of United States law.”  Dissenting 
op. infra at 7-8 (emphasis supplied).  While the meaning of this 
is somewhat unclear (for it seems a hybrid of a counting test and 
a balancing test), it does not constitute an accurate rendering 
of the “substantial contacts” formulation adopted in Rhoditis.  
The “substantial contacts” concept was borrowed from Judge 
Medina, who explained that “something between minimal and 
preponderant contacts is necessary if the Jones Act is to be 
applied.” Bartholomew, 263 F.2d at 440 (emphases supplied).  This 
articulation of the “substantial contacts” standard occurs in the 
paragraph of Judge Medina’s opinion immediately preceding the 
paragraph that the Supreme Court quoted.  Judge Medina’s 
explanation of “substantial contacts” is thus crucial to 
understanding the approach adopted by the Court in Rhoditis, and 
it shows that the American contacts must be more than minimal but 
need not be preponderant. Hence, the dissent’s proposed standard 
is too stringent. 
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 In the following analysis, we “rely on the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law for the relevant principles of 
international law.  Its standards appear fairly supported in the 
decisions of [the Supreme] Court construing international choice-
of-law principles ([e.g.,] Lauritzen, Romero, and McCulloch [v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 83 
S. Ct. 671 (1963)]) . . . .”  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting in 
part).  A primary reason for relying on the Restatement of 
Foreign Relation Law is that one of the Court’s chief motives for 
cabining the potentially unlimited scope of the Jones Act in 
Lauritzen was a concern that the legislation not violate norms of 
international law.  While the dissent argues that the sections we 
rely on “were not meant to apply in a tort case such as this,” 
dissenting op. infra at 4 (quoting RESTATEMENT Pt. IV, Ch. 1, 
Introd. Note, at 237), the passage it quotes reveals that the 
Restatement’s rules are not unconditionally irrelevant to tort 
cases: they only “do not necessarily apply.”  Id. at 5 (different 
emphasis supplied).  However, “[i]n some circumstances, issues of 
private international law may also implicate issues of public 
international law, and many matters of private international law 
have substantial international significance and therefore may be 
considered foreign relations law[.]” RESTATEMENT § 101, cmt. c, at 
23 (emphasis supplied).  The Jones Act and American maritime law 
more generally are examples of just such matters, as is reflected 
by the Supreme Court’s concern in Lauritzen about the prospect of 
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violating international law.0  See also infra note 40(discussing 
                                                           
0While the Restatement of Conflict of Laws is by its terms applicable to cases with foreign 
elements, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1971) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS], this is only “usually” the 
case, see id. § 10, cmt. c, and “[t]here are significant 
differences between interstate and international cases,” see id. 
§ 10, cmt. d. 
 Additionally, to the extent that the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law might seem inapplicable, and the Restatement of 
Conflicts applicable, we note that these two Restatements in many 
respects do not fundamentally differ.  The Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law explains that “[t]he concepts, doctrines, and 
considerations that inform private international law also guide 
the development of some areas of public international law, 
notably the principles limiting the jurisdiction of states to 
prescribe, adjudicate and enforce law.”  RESTATEMENT § 101, cmt. c, 
at 23.  The Restatement of Conflicts provides that “[a] court may 
not apply the local law of its own state to determine a 
particular issue unless [that] would be reasonable in the light 
of the relationship of the state and of other states to the 
person, thing or occurrence involved.”  RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 9, 
at 31.  This is the same sort of analysis employed in our 
opinion.  Indeed, the reasonableness factors of § 403 of the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, see infra note 44 and 
accompanying text, incorporate the general choice of law factors 
of § 6 of the Restatement of Conflicts, see RESTATEMENT § 403, 
reporters’ note 10, at 254; the latter are used to determine the 
state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence 
and the parties, the law of which state governs (under the 
Restatement of Conflicts) the rights and liabilities of the 
parties with respect to tort issues, see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS 
§ 145, at 414.  Additionally, although “[]public international 
law is dealt with only incidentally” in the Restatement of 
Conflicts, the rules of the Restatement of Conflicts “do conform 
. . . to the requirements of public international law.”  Id. § 2, 
cmt. d, at 6.  There is thus important congruence between the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and the Restatement of 
Conflicts with respect to the issues before this court. 
 However, the Restatement of Conflicts rule for personal 
injury actions specifies that “the local law of the state where 
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the 
parties, unless . . . some other state has a more significant 
relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties . . . .”  
Id. § 146, at 430.  This rule gives far too much general 
significance to the place of the wrongful act to constitute a 
satisfactory interpretation of Lauritzen.  See infra at 57-57 
(discussing the variable significance of this factor).  Indeed 
its very formulation seems alien to Lauritzen-type analysis, 
which is the touchstone of Part III of our opinion; this suggests 
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difference between maritime laws and conventional tort law).  
Furthermore, the views of Lea Brilmayer, one of the leading 
authorities in the area, support use of the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law here.  Professor Brilmayer has analyzed 
conflict of laws as “the domestic counterpart of the 
international law issue of the extraterritorial application of 
American law.”  Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application 
of American Law:  A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 
50 L. & Contemp. Probs. 11, 11 (Summer 1987). Of particular 
relevance here, she has noted the unhelpfulness of the 
public/private distinction as regards international law:  
“Whether or not that distinction is viable, it does not describe 
the different roles of the two Restatements.  Some private law 
cases, such as Lauritzen v. Larsen, fall under the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law.”  Id. at 12 (footnote observing that 
Lauritzen is mentioned in the Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law § 403, reporters’ note 2 omitted; emphasis supplied).0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the inappropriateness of the Restatement of Conflicts to this 
case, whatever the declarations of the drafters.  Thus, despite 
the dissent’s comments, we are convinced that our reliance on the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is proper. 
0Cf. also Mary B. McCord, Responding to the Space Station Agreement:  
The Extension of U.S. Law into Space, 77 GEO. L.J. 1933, 1945 
(1989) (suggesting combining the Lauritzen and Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law factors to determine propriety of applying 
American law to incidents aboard hypothetical multinational space 
station).  Additionally, we believe that relying on current 
versions of the Restatement to interpret both general maritime 
law and the Jones Act--even though it was adopted long after the 
Supreme Court announced the Lauritzen factors--is permissible 
because the Jones Act was not locked rigidly into place when 
adopted, see, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 
U.S. 221, 225 n.6, 78 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 n.6 (1958) (discussing 
change in Jones Act statute of limitations upon amendment of FELA 
after enactment of Jones Act); the Act was relatively recently 
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1. Do the Contacts Show a Basis for Prescriptive Jurisdiction? 
 The first essential question in Lauritzen analysis is 
whether the suit implicates significant interests of the United 
States.  In accordance with Lauritzen’s direction to construe 
American maritime law so as not to violate international law, we 
identify this preliminary inquiry with the question whether there 
is a basis for the United States to exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction over the incident at issue. 
 “International law has long recognized limitations on the 
authority of states to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe in 
circumstances affecting the interests of other states.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, Introd. Note, at 230 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].  The Restatement defines 
prescriptive jurisdiction--which is not to be confused with 
subject matter jurisdiction--as the authority of a state “to make 
its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of 
persons, or the interests of person in things . . . .” RESTATEMENT 
§ 401(a).  It lists several alternative bases for prescriptive 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
amended, see Pub. L. 97-389, Title V, § 503(a), 96 Stat. 1955 
(Dec. 29, 1982); when the Court in Rhoditis adopted the concept 
of “substantial contacts” in 1970, it did not specify how to 
determine whether a case in fact involves such contacts with the 
United States; as we have stated, see supra note 37, the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law factors on which we rely 
below derive from the general choice of law factors of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, which was adopted and 
promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1969; and “United 
States courts have considered [rules of international law as to 
prescriptive jurisdiction], and interpreted the known or presumed 
intent of Congress, in the light of changing understandings,” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, Ch. 1, at 236-37 
(1987) (emphasis supplied). 
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jurisdiction.  As a general matter (subject to restrictions we 
discuss below), nations may prescribe law 
 with respect to 
  (1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, 
takes place within its territory; 
 
   * * * 
 
   (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is 
intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory; [and] 
 
  (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of 
its nationals outside as well as within its 
territory[.] 
RESTATEMENT § 402.  Additionally, the Restatement recognizes the 
authority of a state to apply its law to activities connected 
with vessels flying its flag.  See id. § 502. 
 The Lauritzen factors directly provide the answer to the 
first question in the Lauritzen choice of law interest 
analysis--whether (in the terminology of the Restatement) the 
United States has a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction with 
respect to the incident.  When an American worker or a worker 
with American dependents is injured, application of United States 
law will affect the interests and relations of Americans, and 
there are likely to be substantial effects within the United 
States.  Hence, application of American maritime law in suits for 
personal injuries to American seamen or seamen with American 
dependents affects the interests of nationals of the United 
States, thus providing a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction 
pursuant to Restatement § 402(2) and § 402(1)(c).0  Next, by 
                                                           
0Since Neely is undisputedly an American domiciliary and citizen, we do not need to decide here 
what is necessary for a seaman to be treated as an American for purposes of Lauritzen 
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definition, injuries occurring in American territory (including 
waters) fall within § 402(1)(a), which thus recognizes that the 
United States has a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction over such 
incidents.  Where the defendants are American, a basis for 
prescriptive jurisdiction to apply United States law exists 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
analysis.  Cf. Brian Jay Corrigan, The Status of the Quasi-
American Bluewater Seaman in the American Courts, 10 MAR. LAW. 269 
(1987).  But cf. 46 U.S.C. § 688(b)(2) (1988) (placing conditions 
on availability of Jones Act to brownwater seamen not citizens or 
permanent resident aliens of the United States).  Additionally, 
we acknowledge that the “passive personality principle,” which 
“asserts that a state may apply law--particularly criminal 
law--to an act committed outside its territory by a person not 
its national where the victim of the act was its national[,] 
. . . . has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or 
crimes . . . .” RESTATEMENT § 402 cmt. g.  However, the Jones Act 
and the general maritime law unseaworthiness cause of action are 
primarily “concerned with prescribing particular remedies, rather 
than . . . regulating commerce or creating a standard for 
conduct.”  Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 313, 90 S. Ct. at 1736 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting).  Moreover, these causes of action are civil, not 
criminal, and thus represent a lesser potential intrusion on the 
prescriptive jurisdiction of other sovereigns.  See RESTATEMENT 
§ 403 Reporter’s Note 8 (“In applying the principle of 
reasonableness, the exercise of criminal (as distinguished from 
civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in another 
state may be perceived as particularly intrusive. . . .  It is 
generally accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States 
government that criminal jurisdiction over activity with 
substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly 
than civil jurisdiction over the same activity, and only with 
strong justification.”).  Finally, where seamen are injured in 
the course of their employment, torts are not “ordinary,” for 
seamen have long been considered wards of admiralty entitled to 
special protection different from that afforded by conventional 
tort law.  See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 
104, 66 S. Ct. 872, 882 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
seaman has been given a special status in the maritime law as the 
ward of the admiralty, entitled to special protection of the law 
not extended to land employees.”); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. 
Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-31, 59 S. Ct. 262, 266 (1939) (citing 
cases); id. at 431, 59 S. Ct. at 266 (“[S]eamen are the wards of 
the admiralty, whose traditional policy it has been to avoid, 
within reasonable limits, the application of rules of the common 
law which would affect them harshly because of the special 
circumstances attending their calling.”). 
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pursuant to § 402(2).  Where the ship involved flies the American 
flag, § 502 of the Restatement recognizes prescriptive 
jurisdiction on the part of the United States. 
 Finally, parties may generally consent to application of 
American law to govern their relations, as evidenced by a choice 
of law clause.  Cf. National Ass’n of Sporting Goods Wholesalers, 
Inc. v. F.T.L. Mktg. Corp., 779 F.2d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(citing Casio, Inc. v. S.M. & R., Co., 755 F.2d 528, 531 (7th 
Cir. 1985)).  In such cases it may be technically imprecise to 
speak of prescriptive jurisdiction, for American law applies not 
by virtue of the sovereign power of the United States but rather 
by the choice of the parties.  However it is styled, a 
reasonable, mutual, ex ante choice of American law would create 
an American interest in applying the Jones Act or American 
general maritime law sufficient to meet the threshold 
requirement.0 
 In sum, then, we hold that a plaintiff generally must 
establish one of the following to demonstrate a basis for 
prescriptive jurisdiction, which under the Lauritzen analysis is 
a threshold requirement for American maritime law to apply: 
                                                           
0In contrast, however, the mere making of a contract in the United States, without a provision 
agreeing to American law and without other American contacts, would generally be insufficient 
by itself to meet the threshold requirement of a significant American interest in applying 
American law.  Since international commercial shippers customarily have taken on help where 
they have needed it, see Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588, 73 S. Ct. at 931, 
the happenstance of a contract’s being made in an American port 
cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect consent to application 
of American law to any injuries to the bluewater seaman, nor 
would it (without more) ground prescriptive jurisdiction over an 
injury abroad pursuant to § 402(1)(a), for it would not in our 
view constitute a “substantial part” of the relevant conduct. 
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 (a) injury to an American seaman or a seaman with American 
dependents, 
 (b) injury in American territory, 
 (c) American defendants, 
 (d) an American flagged ship, or 
 (e) a contractual choice-of-law clause specifying American 
law. 
See also Bailey v. Dolphin Int’l, Inc., 697 F.2d 1268, 1278 n.25 
(5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] sufficient American interest in a 
particular transaction can rest on the presence of even one 
substantial contact between the transaction and this country 
. . . .”), overruled on other grounds by In re Air Crash Disaster 
Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
 The plaintiff’s threshold burden of proving one of these 
contacts with the United States arises when a defendant alleges 
that American law is inapplicable under the Lauritzen triad.  The 
plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a jury might conclude 
that one of the specified factors supporting prescriptive 
jurisdiction exists, and if the evidence introduced by either 
side (as to the existence vel non of one of the pertinent United 
States contacts) as a whole does not establish by a preponderance 
that such a factor exists, the court must hold American law 
inapplicable. 
 In the present case, the Lauritzen factors clearly exhibit a 
basis for prescriptive jurisdiction.  It is uncontested that 
Neely, the injured seaman, is an American citizen.  This American 
contact is among those we have identified as implicating 
significant American interests, and we turn therefore to the 
second step of the inquiry. 
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2. Are the Contacts Such That Application of American Law Would 
Be Reasonable? 
 Where plaintiffs have shown that there is a basis for 
prescriptive jurisdiction, significant American interests are 
implicated, and courts must consider the second goal of the 
Lauritzen analysis in determining whether American law is 
applicable.  The second step in the Lauritzen choice of law 
inquiry is concerned with resolving or avoiding conflicts with 
foreign law by construing American law in harmony with 
international law.  We identify the pertinent inquiry primarily 
with the restriction on prescriptive jurisdiction described by 
§ 403(1) of the Restatement.  Section 403(1) expresses a 
limitation on the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. It 
specifies that “[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction 
under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having 
connections with another state when the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is unreasonable,” RESTATEMENT § 403(1); in determining 
whether it is reasonable to apply American law, courts are to 
consider “all relevant factors,” id. § 403(2), which includes the 
American contact that provided a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction.0 
                                                           
0For determining whether application of American law is reasonable, the Restatement directs 
courts to evaluate 
all relevant factors, including where appropriate: 
 (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent 
to which the activity takes place within the territory, 
or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon 
or in the territory; 
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 Thus, the plaintiff’s burden of proving the applicability of 
American law translates at this step to a burden of proving 
reasonableness.  This burden does not require the plaintiff to 
show the absence of foreign contacts, or to bear a burden of 
proof with respect to each of the Lauritzen factors, as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or 
economic activity, between the regulating state and the 
person principally responsible for the activity to be 
regulated, or between that state and those whom the 
regulation is designed to protect; 
 (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the 
importance of regulation to the regulating state, the 
extent to which other states regulate such activities, 
and the degree to which the desirability of such 
regulation is generally accepted; 
 (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be 
protected or hurt by the regulation; 
 (e) the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system; 
 (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with 
the traditions of the international system; 
 (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest 
in regulating the activity; and 
 (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another 
state. 
RESTATEMENT § 403(2); see also Republic of Philippines v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 76 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(noting usefulness of these factors). 
 Romero and Rhoditis provide benchmarks by which to gauge 
this reasonableness.  In both of these cases there was a basis 
for prescriptive jurisdiction, for the injuries occurred in 
American waters.  In Romero, where the injured seaman was 
Spanish, the ship was of Spanish registry and sailed under the 
Spanish flag, the shipowner was a Spanish corporation, and the 
seaman’s employment contract was entered into in Spain, the 
Supreme Court held that the contacts with the United States (the 
place of the seaman’s injury and treatment and the largely 
immaterial law of the forum) were not sufficient to justify 
application of American law, 358 U.S. at 383-84, 79 S. Ct. at 
486; we take this to mean that the application of American law 
would not have been reasonable in those circumstances.  In 
Rhoditis, in contrast, the Court determined that the American 
contacts--the place of the wrongful act, law of the forum, and 
defendant’s base of operations--were in combination substantial, 




defendants urge, see Reply Br. of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, at 
3. While there is a dearth of precedent concerning the scope of 
the plaintiff’s burdens when the defendant invokes the Lauritzen 
triad, logic dictates that the plaintiff need adduce evidence 
concerning only those factors that he or she believes support the 
reasonableness of applying American law.  The individual factors 
are not required elements of a Jones Act or general maritime law 
claim--the Supreme Court has made clear that no particular factor 
need reflect a contact with the United States for a plaintiff to 
have a claim under American law, see, e.g., Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 
306, 90 S. Ct. 1731 (applying American law despite foreign 
employer, foreign-flag ship, foreign plaintiff, and contract in 
foreign language specifying foreign law)--but rather are 
subsidiary indicia of the reasonableness of applying American 
law.  Moreover, general choice of law analyses do not deem a 
plaintiff responsible for bringing forth information on all 
circumstances--whether helpful or harmful to the plaintiff’s 
case--that might inform the choice of law.  For all these 
reasons, we decline to impose such a requirement here.0 
                                                           
0The dissent misapprehends the nature of our analysis, believing that our opinion requires 
“defendants to show that United States law does not apply.”  Dissenting op. infra 
at 6.  This inference is unsupported by the quoted passage, which 
only requires defendants to prove the existence of foreign 
contacts to avoid an adverse judgment once plaintiffs have proven 
that there are significant American interests implicated, and 
which does not relieve plaintiff of the ultimate burden of 
showing the applicability of American law.  Similarly, the 
dissent’s bald assertion that under our analysis, defendants who 
show that “more of the factors weigh in favor of the application 
of foreign law” still must “show that the application of United 
States law is unreasonable,” dissenting op. infra at 8, divorces 
the statement on which it relies (“[U]nless virtually all of the 
Lauritzen factors point away from the United States, application 
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 Instead, once the plaintiff has established the existence of 
a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, it is incumbent upon 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of American law will be reasonable . . . .”) from the actual 
framework of the analysis.  Unlike the dissent, our opinion 
clearly states that the quoted proposition is limited to cases 
where there appear no foreign contacts.  In such a case, where 
significant American interests are implicated and no foreign 
interests (so far as the court can tell) are threatened, the 
plaintiff has met his or her burden of showing that application 
of American law is reasonable because only American interests 
have been shown to be at risk. 
 Moreover, the dissent apparently believes that a plaintiff’s 
burden of proving that the American contacts are “substantial” 
implies that individual Lauritzen factors count against the 
plaintiff until she or he proves otherwise.  See, e.g., 
dissenting op. infra at 21 (“Because plaintiff bears the burden 
of proof, this factor [inaccessibility of a foreign forum, which 
the majority opinion treats as neutral] weighs against applying 
United States law to this dispute.”). For this reason the 
dissent’s approach and ours are fundamentally at odds.  In 
metaphorical terms, the majority opinion starts with a normal 
scale, one in balance, and requires the plaintiffs to bring it 
down onto the American side; we compare whatever weights the 
defendants put in the scale against whatever weights the 
plaintiffs put in the scale; and if the scale remains down on the 
foreign side or if it remains in balance at the end of all this, 
the plaintiffs have not made out their burden of proof as to the 
substantiality of American contacts and thus have not prevailed.  
The dissent, in contrast, apparently would start with a skewed 
scale, one pre-positioned down on the foreign side, and require 
plaintiffs first to bring the scales back to equipoise and then 
further to move the American pan beyond that point.  This goes 
beyond placing the burden of proof on the plaintiffs by building 
in a presumption (albeit in theory rebuttable) that in each case 
the Lauritzen factors come stacked against application of 
American law.  That approach is itself unsupported by case law. 
 In rejecting the dissent’s position, we do not suggest that 
the significance of foreign contacts is irrelevant to the 
question whether American contacts are “substantial” enough for 
American law to apply; nevertheless, courts should not uniformly 
presume from the outset that every Jones Act or general maritime 
law suit implicates important foreign interests that will be 
compromised by application of American law.  If the defendant in 
a case does not urge that American law is inapplicable under the 
Lauritzen triad, the court need not even engage in the analysis, 
regardless of what foreign interests could be implicated.  If the 
defendant does not put on evidence that foreign interests are 
indeed implicated, courts should not presume otherwise. 
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defendants to prove the existence of foreign contacts’.  This 
allocation of burdens comports with the remedial policies behind 
the Jones Act (and the unseaworthiness cause of action), which is 
designed for the protection of seamen.  Information relevant to a 
great variety of the circumstances that could figure in a 
Lauritzen analysis may be in the hands of defendants.  We 
therefore believe that it would be at odds with Congress’s 
solicitous intent for courts to require seamen to make a negative 
showing with respect to factors on which they do not rely in 
establishing the reasonableness of applying American law.0 
 If the court concludes that the evidence as a whole does not 
establish the existence of any foreign contacts that would 
provide a foreign nation with a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff immediately prevails on the choice of 
law issue:  a preponderance of--indeed, all--the evidence shows 
that the application of American law in such a case is 
reasonable.  As long as the plaintiff has shown a basis for 
prescriptive jurisdiction, cf. DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 
895, 900 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[D]ue process require[s] the 
identification of significant American interests before an 
American sovereignty . . . [may] export its laws to foreign 
transactions . . . .”), American interests are implicated, and 
maritime law may apply unless concerns about conflicts with the 
law of other interested nations compel the conclusion that this 
would not be reasonable.  Where there are no significant foreign 
                                                           




contacts, the court cannot conclude that any other nation is 
interested in the relevant sense.  And since the plaintiff has by 
this step of the inquiry established an American contact that 
implicates significant American interests, this in turn 
establishes that application of American law is reasonable and 
proper. 
 Foreign contacts standing alone, however, are of extremely 
limited value, for “the actual conflict before the court is a 
conflict between competing laws, not between physical contacts. 
Such conflicts can be resolved intelligently and rationally only 
by ascertaining and evaluating the policies underlying the 
competing laws.”  Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts, 7 MAR. LAW. at 
245; see also Romero, 358 U.S. at 383, 79 S. Ct. at 486 (“The 
controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the 
United States and of foreign countries . . . .”) (emphasis 
supplied).  Indeed, Lauritzen analysis generally seems to 
presuppose that the court has information concerning the 
substantive content of foreign law.  See, e.g., Lauritzen, 345 
U.S. at 575-76, 73 S. Ct. at 924-25 (developing at outset the 
conflict between American and Danish law); id. at 582, 73 S. Ct. 
at 928 (“The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at from 
weighing of the significance of one or more connecting factors 
between the shipping transaction regulated and the national 
interest served by the assertion of authority.”) (emphasis 
supplied). 
 Consequently, where the substance of foreign law is unknown, 
the Lauritzen inquiry could at most be used prophylactically, to 
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steer clear of potential but unknown conflicts. Because holding 
American law inapplicable at this point would do so without a 
textual mandate--and with significant American interests 
present--such judicially imposed restraint should not be de 
rigueur.  A court typically should not hold that the United 
States’ exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is unreasonable in 
a case where the substance of relevant foreign law is unknown, 
unless it concludes that the basis for prescriptive jurisdiction 
is exceedingly weak and that virtually all other contacts likely 
implicate policies of the foreign nation. 
 Moreover, the plaintiff generally has no responsibility to 
demonstrate the content of potentially applicable foreign law.0  
At this step of the inquiry, a defendant’s continued insistence 
that the established American contacts are not “substantial” 
amounts to the argument that American law should be interpreted 
not to apply in order to accommodate the policies served by some 
foreign law.0  In effect, then, the defendant seeks to rely on 
foreign law to set up an obstacle to American law.  For the same 
or similar reasons that plaintiffs need not establish Lauritzen 
                                                           
0But see infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying 
text (discussing burden on foreign plaintiffs in Jones Act 
cases). 
0In construing the Jones Act in Lauritzen, the Supreme Court observed that the 
Act was 
enacted with regard to a seasoned body of maritime law 
developed by the experience of American courts long 
accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling 
our own with foreign interests and in accommodating the 
reach of our own laws to those of other maritime nations. 
345 U.S. at 577, 73 S. Ct. at 925 (emphasis supplied). 
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factors that do not support their case,0 the responsibility for 
demonstrating the content of foreign law rests with the 
defendants who wish to use it to defeat a claim under American 
law.0  To hold otherwise would be at odds with congressional 
intent, for where Congress does want to impose upon a seaman the 
onus of establishing the content of foreign law in order to 
proceed under American law, it knows how to draft an appropriate 
provision:  In the 1982 amendments to the Jones Act, Congress 
denied the benefit of the Act to foreign seamen in certain 
circumstances unless they show that foreign law offers them no 
remedy.  See 46 U.S.C.A. § 688(b)(2).0 
                                                           
0See also Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 584, 73 S. Ct. at 929 (referring to 
the many “varieties of legal authority” through whose territorial 
jurisdiction a seaman might pass). 
0This holding also accords with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
44.1, which provides that “[a] party who intends to raise an 
issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice 
by pleadings or other reasonable notice.”  Cf. 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  CIVIL § 2443, at 642 
(2d ed. 1994) (“Notice normally will be given by the party whose 
claim or defense is based on foreign law.  It would be contrary 
to the purpose of the rule, however, to allow the other party to 
remain silent if no notice has been given and claim at the last 
moment that the opposing party, who has relied irretrievably on 
domestic law, is required to look to foreign law.”) (emphasis 
supplied). 
0See also Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts, 7 MAR. LAW. at 225-26 
(“[C]ongressional delineation of the transnational reach of 
American maritime legislation should be very useful in resolving 
conflicts problems in those areas of admiralty law where Congress 
has not spoken or has spoken with insufficient clarity, such as 
in the area of the general maritime law or the Jones Act.”).  As 
Symeonides notes, the explicit reach of those Congressional 
statutes affecting seamen that do address the choice of law issue 
may suggest that the Jones Act and general maritime law 
unseaworthiness causes of action should be given broad sweep: 
In all of the above cases where Congress has specifically 
addressed the choice-of-law problem, it has delineated the 
reach of American legislative jurisdiction in such an 
expansive way as to include many essentially foreign cases 
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 In this case, the evidence presented at trial establishes 
the existence of foreign contacts, but the defendants have 
presented no information concerning what potentially applicable 
St. Lucian law might provide.  Indeed, even at in banc reargument 
before this court they were unable to state what the law of St. 
Lucia provided (and they have made no post-argument submissions).  
Accordingly, we cannot calibrate the extent of foreign interests 
at stake, and unless virtually all of the Lauritzen factors point 
away from the United States, application of American law will be 
reasonable in light of the American interests that the plaintiff 
has shown to be implicated.  With this in mind, we now consider 
the various factors. 
 a. Inaccessibility of a Foreign Forum 
 We regard the potential inaccessibility of a foreign forum 
as a relatively insignificant factor in favor of the law of any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which would normally fall outside the reach of American law.  
Thus, although all other factors may be foreign, the 
temporary physical presence of the seaman in American waters 
at the time of the filing of the suit suffices for the 
application of the Seamen’s Act.  Similarly, the beginning 
or the termination of the voyage at an American port, 
without any other American connection, suffices for the 
application of the Limitation of Liability Act and COGSA. 
American law is thus made applicable on the showing of only 
a minimum connection with the American legal order. . . .  
[T]his overreach of American legislative jurisdiction is 
less than commendable from an internationalist view point; 
nevertheless, it is the only congressional directive we have 
to delineate the transnational reach of American maritime 
law in general.  Nationalistic or not, the spirit of this 
legislation should provide a guideline in resolving choice-
of-law problems in those areas where Congress has not 
spoken, or has spoken with insufficient clarity as in the 
area of general maritime law, the Jones Act and the Death on 
the High Seas Act (DOHSA). 
Id. at 234-35 (footnotes omitted). 
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jurisdiction, American or St. Lucian.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Lauritzen, inaccessibility of a foreign forum is a 
consideration more appropriate to a forum non conveniens-type 
analysis than to the question of the extraterritorial reach of a 
statute.  See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 589-90, 73 S. Ct. at 932.  
Accordingly, we do not think that the degree to which a forum in 
St. Lucia might be inaccessible to Neely particularly supports 
application of American law in this case.  Nor, however, does it 
count against the reasonableness of applying American law, and 
especially so because the defendants have presented the court 
with no information about what remedies St. Lucian law might or 
might not offer the plaintiff. 
 b. Law of the Forum 
 We do know what American law provides, but the law of the 
forum (the seventh factor) was considered by the Supreme Court in 
Lauritzen to be a very weak consideration in favor of application 
of American law: 
The purpose of a conflicts-of-laws doctrine is to assure 
that a case will be treated in the same way under the 
appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances 
which often determine the forum.  Jurisdiction of maritime 
cases in all countries is so wide and the nature of its 
subject matter so far-flung that there would be no 
justification for altering the law of a controversy just 
because local jurisdiction of the parties is available. 
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 591, 73 S. Ct. at 932.  Despite this 
disparagement of the law of the forum, the Court treated it as a 
relevant factor in Rhoditis.  See Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 308, 90 
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S. Ct. at 1733.  Thus, albeit weakly, the law of the forum 
supports application of American law.0 
 c. Place of the Wrongful Act 
 In conducting the Lauritzen reasonableness inquiry, courts 
must attend to the context of the incident at the heart of the 
suit.  Where seamen are not plying the world’s seas in 
traditional international shipping activity, some contacts take 
on heightened significance and others diminished significance, 
for some of the rationales concerning the significance of the 
factors articulated in the Lauritzen opinion do not apply with 
the same force in all circumstances.  See, e.g., Zipfel v. 
Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1987); Chiazor 
v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir. 1981), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Air Crash Disaster Near New 
Orleans, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).  Although some 
of the cases recognizing the variability of the Lauritzen 
factors’ significance refer to the type of vessel at issue, see, 
e.g., Zipfel, 832 F.2d at 1482 (“cases involving atypical 
vessels”), the basis for the distinctions is not the nature of 
the vessel but rather, as our discussion below illustrates, the 
nature of the activity, see, e.g., Fogleman v. ARAMCO, 920 F.2d 
278, 282 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he significance of each factor in a 
                                                           
0While the dissent correctly characterizes the passage we quote from Lauritzen as 
signifying that the law of the forum factor “should not dictate 
the substantive law to be applied,” dissenting op. infra at 27 
(emphasis supplied), it is incorrect in suggesting that the law 
of the forum is irrelevant:  there is a difference between being 
irrelevant and being non-dispositive.  Hence our conclusion is 




nontraditional maritime context like offshore oil production may 
vary from that in the traditional shipping context in which the 
Lauritzen-Rhoditis test arose.”) (emphases supplied); Phillips v. 
Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(distinguishing the case before the court from “a typical 
maritime case involving a vessel sailing in international 
commerce”) (emphasis supplied).  Common sense confirms that this 
is a non-traditional Jones Act case.  The activity here took the 
Long John and its crew not from sea to sea in pursuit of 
international commerce but rather from beach to reef in aid of 
scuba diving adventures.  This case is thus the antithesis of a 
traditional international shipping case, and we treat it 
accordingly.0 
                                                           
0The dissent believes that the majority opinion “adopts inconsistent positions when discussing the 
traditional or nontraditional character of the activity in which the Long John was engaged 
. . . .”  Dissenting op. infra at 15.  However, there is no 
inconsistency.  Our jurisdictional conclusion in Part II supra 
was that the activity of the Long John was “substantial[ly] 
relat[ed] to traditional maritime activity.”  Jerome B. Grubart, 
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1051 
(1995) (quoted without alteration or emphasis supra at 25).  The 
Supreme Court itself has distinguished between vessels actually 
“engaged in commercial maritime activity”, Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982), and 
ones whose activity “bears a substantial relationship to 
traditional maritime activity,” id. at 675 n.5, 102 S. Ct. at 
2658 n.5.  Only the latter is necessary for admiralty 
jurisdiction, but more than that is presupposed at some points in 
the reasoning of Lauritzen. 
 In this case, the Long John’s expeditions, involving 
navigation of a vessel in navigable waters, bore a substantial 
relationship to traditional maritime activity, but the vessel was 
not engaged in commercial maritime activity.  Here, the salient 
fact, that to which we refer by the designation “non-traditional 
activity,” is that the Long John did not travel the world’s seas 
engaged in commercial shipping.  As our opinion explains, it is 
this substantive factor of traveling or lack thereof -- and not 
any purported formal similarity of the Long John to various oil-
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 In traditional international shipping contexts, the place of 
the wrongful act is accorded little importance in the choice of 
law inquiry.  International shipping vessels journey through the 
waters of many different nations, and the local law might 
therefore change frequently, see Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585, 73 
S. Ct. at 930, rendering difficult the protection or even the 
formation of justified expectations about the law governing 
seamen’s employment relations if the place of the injury were a 
significant factor.  Cf. Romero, 358 U.S. at 384, 79 S. Ct. at 
486 (“an unduly speculative burden”).  Moreover, the site of the 
injury will largely be fortuitous when the seaman is exposed to 
the same risks throughout the course of the journey and an 
accident happens to occur in a particular locale.  See, e.g., 
id.; Fogleman, 920 F.2d at 282 (“The place of the wrongful act is 
accorded little weight in traditional maritime cases, in which 
the locality of the ship changes constantly.”). 
 In non-traditional contexts, however, the vessels at issue 
do not ply the waters of multiple seas.  It may be predicted at 
the outset that any injuries will likely occur, non-fortuitously, 
in the locale where the vessel is stationed.  Thus, the justified 
expectations would not be thwarted if the place of the act were 
considered a significant choice of law factor.  See, e.g., 
Fogleman, 920 F.2d at 282 (“When the injury stems from work on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
drilling rigs or supposed resemblance of the Long John’s scuba 
diving missions to oil-drilling operations -- that bears upon 
some of the rationales in Lauritzen and thus upon the 
significance of some of the Lauritzen factors. 
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permanently situated offshore oil rig or work platform, however, 
the place of the wrong assumes greater importance.”). 
 This “shift” is relevant in this case, which did not arise 
in a traditional international shipping context.  Admittedly, the 
Long John, the ship that injured plaintiff, was a sixteen metric 
ton vessel capable of plying the high seas, unlike the drilling 
platforms that have been involved in many non-traditional cases.  
But as we have already explained, it is the nature of the 
activity, not of the vessel, that matters.  The Long John was 
used at the time of plaintiff’s accident solely for Club Med 
scuba diving expeditions in the waters off St. Lucia.  Similarly, 
plaintiff, an American citizen, contracted in the United States 
to serve as a scuba instructor, specifically to take Club Med 
guests on scuba diving expeditions off the coast of St. Lucia.  
She was a crewmember of a fleet (which included the Long John) 
used solely for this purpose. Thus, the location of this accident 
was not “fortuitous” in the same way as that of a shipboard tort 
against a traditional seaman.  Due to the non-traditional context 
of this suit, the place of the wrongful act would normally take 
on greater significance. 
 All parties now agree that the injury occurred in St. Lucian 
waters, and there is no suggestion that the allegedly improper 
training complained of by the plaintiff in her Jones Act count 
occurred in the United States.  The location of this accident 
presumably implicates, with more force than it might in cases 
involving traditional sea-going vessels, whatever regulatory 
interests St. Lucia may have in applying its law to this 
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accident.  But because St. Lucia’s interests are undefined in 
this case, this factor does not strongly suggest that application 
of American law would not be reasonable.0 
 d. Place of Contract 
 Another factor whose significance shifts in non-traditional 
contexts is the place of contract.  In Lauritzen, the Supreme 
Court discounted the importance of the place of contract for 
choice of law.  It reasoned that “[a] seaman takes his 
employment, like his fun, where he finds it; a ship takes on crew 
in any port where it needs them.”  345 U.S. at 588, 73 S. Ct. at 
931.  However, although the place of contracting is “of little 
import due to its ‘fortuitous’ occurrence for the traditional 
seaman, [it] becomes a substantial factor in nontraditional 
maritime employment aboard a vessel more or less permanently 
located off the coast of a particular country.”  Fogleman, 920 
F.2d at 283 (footnotes omitted).  See also Chiazor, 648 F.2d at 
1019. 
 The relatively stationary nature of the employment setting 
allows the ex ante formation of reasonable beliefs about the 
locale of likely work-related injuries, and there are therefore 
                                                           
0The dissent asserts that this conclusion contradicts our earlier conclusion that the accident here is 
the sort with a potential for disrupting maritime commerce.  See dissenting op. infra 
at 23.  There is no contradiction.  We do not doubt the 
possibility that St. Lucia could have interests in investigating 
incidents such as this one or in preventing unseaworthy 
conditions such as those involved here.  However, without knowing 
the content of St. Lucian law, we have no basis for concluding 
that application of American law threatens whatever St. Lucia’s 
interests may be, and thus the place of the wrongful act in this 
case presents little reason to “accommodate the reach” of 
American maritime laws to those of St. Lucia.  See supra note 
50and accompanying text. 
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fewer unforeseen contingencies to detract from the importance of 
the site of contracting.  The Court downplayed this factor in 
Lauritzen largely because of the fortuity of the place of 
contracting, when international shippers took on crew as needed 
in various nations’ ports. However, with a non-traditional 
operation such as the one here, employers need not (and do not) 
take on crewmembers at random ports as hiring needs dictate; 
rather, they may (and do) select employees in advance, wherever 
they choose. 
 In this case, the place of contracting was the United 
States.  After interviewing in the United States, plaintiff 
received a letter of interest from the defendants before their 
need for another scuba instructor at Holiday Village even arose.  
Several months later she formed an oral contract to work for Club 
Med Management and Holiday Village in St. Lucia for six weeks, 
with offer and acceptance occurring during a telephone call 
between New York and either Washington, D.C. or Pennsylvania.  
Thus, since the parties contracted in America for employment in a 
determinate, fix_! 
